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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY'S
GLOBAL EMPIRE**

by

Scott P. Noon

LTC, United States Army

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LTC(P) Scott P. Noon

United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: 

1 April 2015

Thesis Adviser:


Signature: 

**Gregory Miller, PhD
Associate Professor, Joint Advanced
Warfighting School
Thesis Advisor**

Signature: 

**Michael Bennett
USSOCOM, Joint Special Operations
University
SOF Chair, Joint Forces Staff College
Committee Member**

Approved by:

Signature: 

**Dr. Robert M. Antis
Acting Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting
School**

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ABSTRACT

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States became the world's sole superpower. With this status came an unchecked and impressive global force posture. While the United States dramatically cut the number of personnel in Western Europe, it remains fully engaged throughout the world and has personnel deployed or stationed in over 150 countries. These personnel and facilities ostensibly exist to help the U.S. support its vital national interests. While the United States wished to draw down forces after combat and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military remains globally committed in support of a variety of missions and operations. In the current fiscal environment, this desire to engage and intervene using military force is no longer sustainable. This thesis reviews strategic guidance documents, evaluates the current pre-positioned equipment concepts, and evaluates Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) as a case study for Force Posture. The conclusion offers five recommendations for the future of United States global force posture and actions that support access.

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Chapter 1-Introduction

In 2015, the United States is the most powerful and capable military force in the world. According to several recent databases on national defense spending, the United States spent over \$600 Billion for defense in 2013.¹ This is more than 36% of the world's total spending on defense, and the United States outspent the number two spender (China) by \$413 Billion. While truly accurate information is a challenge to find, open source reporting shows that the United States deploys or stations military forces in 169 countries serving as a deterrent, fighting violent extremism, building goodwill, serving as peacekeepers, or attempting to stop pandemic diseases.² Although the United States hoped to capitalize on a Peace Dividend after the Cold War, just the opposite occurred. The number of military and requisite support personnel that took part in a variety of combat and operational or contingency deployments grew significantly after 1990. While some critics of current foreign policy like Barry Posen and Chalmers Johnson argue for a more isolationist approach to foreign policy as the world's sole superpower, the United States voluntarily chooses to involve itself in hundreds of deployments, exercises, engagements, and continues forward positioning of its forces to respond to a variety of global requirements.³ Whether total retrenchment, forcing allies to do their part in defense spending (allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), or

¹ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm Institute for Peace Research International, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (accessed on 25 November 2014).

² Total Military Personnel and End Strength by Service, Regional Area, and Country, September 30, 2014, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=SIAD_309_Report_P1409.xlsx&groupName=milRegionCountry (accessed on 30 NOV, 2014).

³ Barry R. Posen, *Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138466/barry-r-posen/pull-back>, (accessed on 18 February 2015).

executing continued cutbacks in U.S. defense spending-the status quo of force posture is not sustainable. While the United States has far fewer military personnel in Western Europe than it did during the Cold War, military personnel are ensconced in a global network of installations and support facilities. No other nation's military enjoys the current access or reach of the 21st Century United States Defense Enterprise.

This thesis contends to prove that the United States is on an unsustainable path for global force posture and forward deployed military presence. U.S. strategic leaders must change their expectations of the military and how it is used in support of national interests. The strategic and accompanying high-level guidance documents of United States are not effectively linked to the global force posture, there is a continuing requirement for a Continental U.S. Base Realignment and Closure (CONUS BRAC), and the U.S. must improve its program/system(s) of pre-positioned equipment. Because of this disconnect with global force posture, as well as the requirement for additional CONUS BRAC base closure reviews, the Department of Defense spends too much money on unnecessary facilities and infrastructure.

Chapter Two provides thorough analysis of the unclassified strategic documents linked to the current global force posture and recommendations for updates on the process. As the United States looks towards the future, an evaluation of the Pre-Positioned Stocks is required. In preparation for conflict(s), all of the services position combat equipment, supplies, ammunition, and spare parts around the world to enhance readiness and decrease response time to the combat or operational requirement. While not a complete analysis of the Pre-Positioned stocks this thesis presents some recommendations for future consideration. Chapter Three and Four include an evaluation

of force posture in support of combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and how the force posture adapted to support this challenging theater as well as a short discussion on the retrograde from Afghanistan and the logistical challenges, for future force posture decisions. Finally, this thesis reviews the concept of security cooperation activities in the absence of force posture is reviewed as a less expensive method to potentially achieve some of the desired effects. The conclusion also discusses additional options for the future based on the continuous uncertain turn of world events and the U.S. military budget.

While the United States was not a historical colonial power, it gained some territory following the Spanish American War. Facilities in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico were some of the first overseas or OCONUS (Outside the Continental United States) bases on which US military forces served. The end of World War II led to a large number of locations and facilities where the US military began to build its significant force structure. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also facilitated the requirement to bolster a collective defense and base thousands of troops across member nations. The occupation of Japan and subsequent conflict in Korea led to a sizable force presence in the Pacific region as well. According to the Fiscal Year 2014 Base Structure Report, the United States operates over 576 overseas military installations or facilities.⁴ This number is down from the 850 installations reported in the “Strengthening the U.S. Global Force Posture Report to Congress, September 2004”.⁵

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2014 Baseline, p. 6, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY14.pdf> (accessed on 30 NOV 2014).

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Strengthening U.S. Global Force Posture, Report to Congress, September 2004*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), 13.

The 2004 Global Force Posture Report directed changes that the Department of Defense executed. The objective was a reduction of 35% of the overseas facilities, and the past ten years saw a 32% reduction, which is very close to the objective laid out in the report. Considering the activities and operational requirements of the military from 2004 to the present, these reductions are significant. While there is historically bureaucracy and unwillingness to shutter military installations after years of use, this 32% reduction illustrates that the DoD can make changes and follow policy or Congressional guidance. This reduction took almost ten years to complete as many steps in this process take years to plan and execute. Planning includes multiple U.S. interests (many non-military including Department of State, Environment Protection Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, etc.) as well as significant negotiations and discussions with the host nation. In addition to the simple fiscal requirements and challenges facing policy makers/strategists, how does the United States ensure that its 576 facilities and locations are in keeping with the desired and stated national interests of the U.S.?

The concept of a globally postured military in the 21st Century answers questions of how the United States sought (and seeks) to support its vital national interests. In the post-Cold War era (1990-present) the United States military is the enforcement arm of the world's sole superpower. Whether it is President Obama's thoughts of maintaining international order, or Presidents Clinton's and Bush's support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion in 1999 and 2004, the United States was obligated to do more and be in more places because of its policy decisions. Some of the primary questions that must be answered are whether the United States should be in all of these places around the world, or whether a more isolationist approach is required in this more

fiscally restrained environment. Based on the global environment, the willingness of western countries, and specifically the U.S., to intervene militarily will remain. The next 15-20 years will likely see failing states and non-state actors continually challenge the accepted norms, international standards, access to the global commons, and shared values. While the answer to these questions lie primarily with political decision and policy makers, this thesis outlines some options for how to best utilize the assets that are available to the U.S. military and potentially how to get the desired effects with less forward posture/presence.

Chapter 2-Review of Strategic Documents

A globally based and capable U.S. military is an integral part of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). President Obama's 2010 NSS advocates to promote the U.S. interests of providing security, prosperity, values, and international order, the execution of which requires a capable and flexible military force that can respond and act in a timely manner. All the concepts of building partner nation capacity, fighting terrorism, denying safe havens, counter-proliferation and enabling other nations to achieve balanced and sustainable growth, occasionally (and/or potentially often) require the use of military personnel or systems and equipment.

The NSS does not speak to specific global force posture requirements or make recommendations on how the military should organize to complete its assigned missions. Using the NSS as a guiding doctrine or document, President Obama leaned heavily upon the capabilities, flexibility, and global reach of the military. Under President Obama's administration, the U.S. military bombed Islamic State in the Levant or in Syria (ISIL or ISIS) targets in Iraq, conducted counter Al Qaeda missile strikes from drones in Yemen, provided humanitarian assistance to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia, and conducted the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. These actions show that the current administration is not afraid to utilize the U.S. military to support its global foreign policy objectives and support U.S. national interests. While there is significant discussion and desire to reduce overall defense spending, the commitment of forces and capabilities over the past six years remains high. The Budget Control Act will drive significant changes in the force structure and potentially the force posture over the next

ten plus years as budgets will focus on readiness and major programs as opposed to overseas infrastructure.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in March 2014 analyzes the security environment, overall military strategy, and direction for the next four years. The most succinct and direct discussion on force posture is found in the Executive Summary, which details the commitment to the Asia-Pacific “rebalance” and the commitment to Korea as a key pillar to our regional approach. According to the QDR, the U.S. will maintain a robust footprint in North Asia (Korea), while “enhancing presence” in Oceania and South Asia (interpreted as Australia). Published before the ISIL threat and subsequent commitment of U.S. forces, the QDR suggests that the Middle East remains an enduring interest and that U.S. force posture must enable a swift response to crisis, deter aggression and assure allies and partners. In terms of Europe, it reinforces the requirement for a forward deployed posture that promotes regional stability to improve capacity and interoperability amongst key partner nations and allies. As the U.S. has since World War II, the QDR supports the need to maintain access to surge forces rapidly in the event of a crisis.¹

In the second chapter of the QDR, “the Defense Strategy”, there are further general discussions on force posture and how they support national interests. As is a common theme in this QDR, the fiscal restraints of the era are tied into every chapter and idea. The QDR directly addresses the U.S. requirement to project power and win decisively.² Whether the U.S. forces deploy from home or use overseas base

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review*, March, 2014 (Washington, DC., Department of Defense), EXSUM, VIII.

² *Ibid.*, 19.

infrastructure, the necessity to deploy quickly and decisively is a key element of the U.S. national strategy, either as a show of force, deterrent, or contingency response to foreign aggression. These deployments are proving frequent and potentially more challenging when not in direct response to a nation state but to a non-state actor or group such as ISIL.

Additional challenges (such as piracy or terrorism), with the current security environment push U.S. planners to consider additional options. These include forward deployed naval assets (especially in the Asia-Pacific), the need to deploy new combinations of ships, aviation assets and crisis response elements that better support Combatant Commanders steady state and contingency requirements, and use of regionally aligned ground forces that can achieve regional and global objectives.³ In the final portion of the QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS or Chairman) states the requirement to balance permanent, prepositioned, and rotational presence with surge capability. The CJCS continues that the U.S. must deter adversaries while addressing many responsibilities around the world. He concludes with the statement that U.S. military forces must be globally present to deter conflict, protect the global commons, and keep war far from the U.S. shores and U.S. citizens. He argues that these are unique military obligations and they are inherently expensive.⁴

The current Defense Strategic Guidance was published in January 2012. It is a relatively concise document presented by the Secretary of Defense with an introduction signed by the President. In Secretary Panetta's cover letter, he states that the U.S.

³ Ibid., 23.

⁴ Ibid., 60, 63.

military will have “global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions”.⁵ There are many references or inferences to force posture in this guidance. Important to this theme is the concept of regional or global access. While a forward postured force certainly provides this, it is not always feasible or required. Access is achievable through a variety of means including naval power, security cooperation, or simply a willing host nation. When basing of U.S. forces is not possible, the U.S. would benefit from access. Additional challenges of access stem from countries or regions that do not wish to provide access. The concept of defeating an adversary’s Anti Access/Area Denial capability is related to power projection and is required as a primary mission of the United States military; however this is an entirely different aspect of force posture and projection.⁶

In regards to security cooperation posture, the U.S. seeks to be the “security partner of choice” across the globe. The intent is to develop innovative, low cost and small footprint approaches to achieve security objectives.⁷ To deter and defeat aggression, U.S. forces will be responsive and capitalize on “balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur”.⁸ To conduct low cost and small footprint security cooperation and to maintain agility to prepare for conflicts are both extremely challenging propositions with which each Combatant Command will struggle for the near

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January, 2012 (Washington, DC., Department of Defense), Introduction.

⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁸ Ibid., 4.

to midterm future. Each of the services will also struggle with determining how best to develop acquisition strategies that support “balanced lift and prepositioned equipment to maintain agility”.

The final strategic planning document this thesis evaluates is the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO). Published in September 2012, the CCJO is the Chairman’s means to communicate to the joint force how to best prepare for the near-intermediate future and how the U.S. military should devise new concepts of operation for the next ten years. The concept of “globally integrated operations” is introduced in which joint force elements, globally postured, combine quickly with each other and mission partners to integrate capabilities across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.⁹ Specifically in regards to force posture and prepositioning of wartime equipment, the concept of globally integrated operations is directly addressed in only one paragraph. The CCJO states that globally integrated operations both enable and are premised upon global agility. Because all joint operations begin from a combination of home station bases, forward deployed forces, and potentially require the use of prepositioned equipment, the U.S. must be able to develop swift and adaptable responses to quickly developing global crises. The CCJO also states that smarter positioning of forces, as well as greater use of prepositioned stocks and rapid expeditionary basing, will increase overall operational reach.¹⁰ While the CCJO provides some ideas and concepts for which force developers and joint force commanders can plan, the guidance it provides for force posture does not shed significant light on where

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, September 2012, (Washington DC, Dept. of Defense), iii.

¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

U.S. forces should base or how and where equipment should be prepositioned. Global agility is a highly desirable military attribute, but it comes with a significant price tag.

While the global force posture ebbs and flows based to a certain extent on current operations and contingencies, the last major review to have significant implication was the 2004 Global Defense Posture DoD Report to Congress. This report laid out detailed plans and concepts to realign the force, and attempted to align the base structure with the overall concept of force transformation. An assumption used in this report is still valid today: most of our forward deployed troops will not fight in place, but will use their forward deployed locations to get to their theater of operations quicker. The only location this may not be true is the Republic of Korea. This means that every U.S. military installation or facility should be used or designed with force/power projection in mind. Every installation should be evaluated for its effectiveness or usefulness in improving the concept of global agility. This is a change from the Cold War era where most locations for U.S. military facilities were chosen as part of a defense in depth strategy. This type of posture review should be accomplished every ten years with some sort of azimuth check or progress report at the five year mark on any and all recommendations made. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) or other uninterested party should coordinate the efforts of this study.

A consistent theme of U.S. government strategic documents is that of military response whenever national interests are threatened. This is what the military is supposed to do and what it has done in the post-World War II era. While all the documents stress the requirements of the military to be globally postured and capable of rapid response, none of them provide any significant guidance or detail about how or where to do these

things. With the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, the strategic level documents do not provide guidance about how to organize the joint force to accomplish this. While one could argue that these high-level documents should not provide the details, one could realistically believe that they provide some concrete indicators of how and where to best utilize resources. Reading the documents, one might believe that the U.S. military must be ready to respond to a huge number of possible contingencies anywhere in the world, maintain the agility and technical competence to get there quickly, and then win. In the current fiscal environment this is an unrealistic and potentially naïve expectation.

The Government Accountability Office recognized this same fact (in 2006) and reported that the strategic documents describe the problem the strategy is directed against, and describe how the strategy is to be integrated with related strategies (nesting), but fail to include three critical components in determining the proper force posture. The three neglected “characteristics” are: (1) the DOD does not establish operational effectiveness of facilities or quality of life; (2) sources of funding for the force posture and installations are not identified or prioritized and; (3) the DOD does not identify a process for resolving or identifying priorities within the DOD or other government organizations.¹¹ In the future, these documents must either show some restraint or provide some additional granularity and policy guidance about how and where to focus to most effectively use the provided resources. This is especially true for determining where and how to posture the force for the projected requirements. For example, the “rebalance” to the Pacific in these policy documents could include some details about

¹¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management, Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring*, by Janet St. Laurent, Open-File Report, U.S. GAO (Washington, DC, 2006).

how basing more Navy assets in the region (and potentially exactly where) could serve as a deterrent. If the U.S. wishes to retain its superpower status, its global force posture and global agility are critically important elements of that strategy.

Chapter 3-Afghanistan-a Case Study for Force Posture?

This chapter evaluates the conflict in Afghanistan from a force posture lens.

While the United States did not foresee a significant ground conflict in Afghanistan prior to 2001, how did the military community adapt and what resources were required to move a massive amount of troops and sustainment into the country? Did the United States have existing facilities and equipment that facilitated timely operations or did it rely on other nations and their infrastructure? From the initial combat operations that began in October 2001 to the official end of Operation Enduring Freedom in December 2014, the U.S. military deployed and redeployed over 750,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines with all of their associated combat and support equipment with a loss of 2,356 Americans (in OEF as of 1 January 2015).¹ OEF has been a long and expensive conflict for the United States in terms of blood and treasure.

Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, military strategists immediately began planning for operations against Al Qaeda based in the Taliban controlled, land locked country of Afghanistan. The country's geography offers significant challenges to any foreign military power. In 2001, the U.S. relationship with many of the nations bordering Afghanistan was marginal at best. With the Cold War thawing, the U.S. was still developing relations with the former Soviet Republics that bordered Afghanistan in the North. Diplomatic relations with Iran were non-existent since 1979, and while the U.S. supported President Musharraf in Pakistan, there was a lack of governance and oversight of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as well as

¹ icasualties.org, "Operation Enduring Freedom Casualties", <http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed January 1, 2015).

much of the Afghan-Pakistan border area. The Pakistani population was generally sympathetic to the Taliban regime. One benefit of the ongoing U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM or CENTCOM) Theater Security Cooperation effort was the Partnership for Peace Program, which began in the 1990s with former Soviet countries. The creation of the Central Asian Battalion, and ongoing exercises in 1998 and 1999 with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, facilitated a warm start with these countries. As a result there was a contingent of U.S. Special Forces in Kazakhstan on September 11, 2001. The CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, visited President Karimov of Uzbekistan twice in the 12 months prior to September 2001.²

The United States was not ideally postured for a significant ground conflict in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In the 1990s, CENTCOM concentrated its force posture and infrastructure resources on the volatile Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. The U.S. military maintained a forward deployed presence in Kuwait (to deter Iraq), and a small CENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar. The Air Force operated out of several Gulf locations, but primarily Kuwait and Qatar. The Navy's maritime elements operated in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and operated a sustainment and headquarters facility in Bahrain. Even to consider an air campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, cooperation from many countries was required. Search and rescue forces needed basing, air-to-air tanker routes were needed, and overflight access was required for numerous neighbor countries. Before the U.S. could initiate any offensive operations, it required a significant effort of diplomacy. The

² Donald P. Wright, James R. Bird, *A Different Kind of War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 37.

President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, CENTCOM Commander, CENTCOM Deputy Commander, and many others coordinated with U.S. Ambassadors and foreign heads of state to secure their cooperation in what became Operation Enduring Freedom. As with all diplomatic efforts, there was some give and take, and while the U.S. gained access at this critical junction in time, many nations successfully negotiated to their benefit. Whether the U.S. agreed to share a new weapons system or relieve them of some foreign debt, the U.S. rarely got something for nothing.³ This was also a critical junction during which the U.S. government successfully built a coalition of nations committed to the removal of Al Qaeda and the overall Afghanistan effort. This coalition, which initially deployed in December 2001, eventually became known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and grew to 48 troop-contributing nations over the course of the conflict.

When President Bush decided on the military option, which involved the removal of the Taliban from governance in Afghanistan, he also approved CENTCOM's concept of operations, which primarily involved air power, special operations forces, and CIA support to the Northern Alliance.⁴ Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld traveled to Uzbekistan to meet with President Karimov to get his support for military offensive operations and basing of U.S. forces at Kharshi-Khanabad (K2) Air Base. This was one of the primary Soviet staging bases used during their 1979-1989 Afghan campaign. Pakistan also provided key and essential access to airfields as well as overflight rights.

³ Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, USMC (RET) and Noah Lukeman, *Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing INC, 2004), 29-30.

⁴ Donald P. Wright, James R. Bird, *A Different Kind of War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 30.

Refueling and CSAR assets were initially based in three facilities in southwestern Pakistan, and the Pakistani decision to support the U.S. military operations was truly strategic for the United States, but also for the Pakistani government. The Pakistani's secured billions of dollars in aid packages, military training assistance, and foreign military sales.

When the U.S. began airstrikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets on 7 October 2001, it was via a variety of means. Air attacks originated from two Carrier Strike Groups in the Indian Ocean (USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson), as well as B-1 and B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia, and B-2 bombers from Whiteman AFB in Missouri. Initial strikes also included over 50 Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles from two U.S. Destroyers and U.S. and British submarines. The aircraft were initially supported by both U.S. and U.K. tankers based in the Middle East (Qatar, Oman).⁵ As the airstrikes continued, ground forces staged in K2, Uzbekistan and as Special Operations Forces (SOF) arrived they moved into Northern Afghanistan to partner with the Northern Alliance leaders. SOF also conducted an operation to capture or kill Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader and closest thing to a Taliban head of state. This complex operation on 19-20 October 2001 included SOF helicopters and assault forces operating off the USS Kitty Hawk in the Indian Ocean, and Rangers flying from Masirah, Oman to jump into an airfield south of Kandahar, Afghanistan to secure a transload site. Unfortunately, the casualties from this operation came not from any direct fire, but from a helicopter rollover in Pakistan. With television coverage from the airborne assault released

⁵ Dick Camp, *Boots on the Ground: The Fight to Liberate Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 2001-2002* (Minneapolis, MN, Zenith Press, 2011) 101-105.

immediately, the scope and ability of U.S. forces sent a powerful message to the world. The U.S. had the operational reach and could strike almost anywhere in Afghanistan with relative impunity of the Taliban to stop it. At this time however, the United States did not have the required access or posture to deploy and sustain a large number of troops into Afghanistan proper.

As combat operations involving U.S. and international troop concentrations increased in Afghanistan the U.S. established bases inside the country. Soon, the regional hubs of Bagram (40 miles north of Kabul), and Kandahar were established. Kabul International Airport also became a hub for personnel and equipment flowing into the capital region. Airstrips were improved, repaired, and expanded to facilitate heavy airlift requirements. Demining operations began to clear holding yards, billeting areas, and ammunition storage points. The U.S. continued to occupy and improve Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan, until 2005 at which time the Uzbeks exercised their right (according to the 2001 bilateral agreement) to request the U.S. military departure. K2 was used primarily as a logistics hub after late 2001, and a place through which to flow personnel and deploying equipment. The Uzbek government struggled with internal security and human rights violations. Diplomatic friction between the Uzbek leadership and the U.S. (as well as other European nations) led to Uzbek request for coalition forces to vacate K2.⁶

The U.S. also negotiated for airfield access in the other northern “Stans”. Refueling operations took place in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The

⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Uzbekistan's Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications* by CRS, January 2006 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 1-3.

Transit Center in Manas (Bishkek), Kyrgyzstan became the primary transload location for personnel coming and going from Afghanistan after K2 was shut down (until that point it was primarily a base for KC-135 refueling aircraft).⁷ Personnel could arrive or depart to U.S. locations from Manas in contracted airliners and would fly back and forth to Afghanistan in military cargo aircraft such as C-17 or C-130. Manas was a critical node from 2005 until it closed in early 2014. It served multiple purposes including the primary clearing house for all USAF personnel that deployed into Afghanistan. The U.S. increased capacity to handle the surge of 2010-2011 and the Kyrgyz leadership renegotiated their lease with the U.S. in 2010 netting an additional \$43 million per year.⁸ The U.S. continued to buy a significant amount of fuel from the host nation yet the Russians were not happy with U.S. military presence in the region and they pushed the Kyrgyz government to lobby for the expulsion of U.S. forces (which took place by the spring of 2014)⁹.

While air routes into Afghanistan were critical for initial access, the ground lines of communication (GLOC) were essential to the buildup and sustainment of operations (still ongoing in 2015). The primary GLOC was from the Pakistani Port of Karachi through the Afghan border entry points of Spin Boldak and the Torkham Gate (Khyber Pass). The sheer volume of conducting and sustaining operations required food, supplies,

⁷ KYRGYZSTAN: Alternatives are few to US Manas Airbase OxResearch Daily Brief News Service, June 8, 2010, <http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/docview/365586321?accountid=12686> (accessed December 27, 2014).

⁸ Congressional Research Service, *Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications*, by Jim Nichols, the Congressional Research Service. July 2009 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1.

⁹ Zillo, Amanda, *Air Base Closure Reshapes Kyrgyz-Russian Relations*, Global Risks Insights, July 4, 2013, <http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/07/air-base-closure-reshapes-kyrgyz-russian-relations/> (accessed March 30, 2015).

vehicles, and combat support equipment to arrive from CONUS, through Karachi, to the final destination over the ground. Whether supplies for the Army Air Force Exchange Service or building materials, air transport is extremely expensive. As in centuries past, criminals, thieves, and businessmen developed methods to cheat the shippers. Millions of dollars of U.S. government property was stolen and often only 50% of the contracted fuel reached its final destination. Pilferage was a common threat and security of the routes was a frequent concern for the truck drivers.¹⁰

While some military equipment could travel via unescorted convoys to or from the port to U.S. military installations in Afghanistan, a great number of things could not. Ammunition, weapons, mail, combat vehicles, and sensitive communication systems all came via aircraft. This requirement taxed the U.S. military capacity and logisticians contracted air support via commercial means. This capability was especially vital when the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles began to flow into theater in 2008-2011 (in significant number). Several thousand of these vehicles came into Afghanistan via U.S. military and commercial transport aircraft. Most of these vehicles were built in the U.S., and then shipped via sealift to Oman or the United Arab Emirates where the various military and commercial aircraft then flew one to six MRAPs into theater per sortie (depending on MRAP and aircraft type).

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Afghan theater benefitted from increased global posture in the Middle East and greater general capacity in the CENTCOM Theater. Expansion of facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE brought

¹⁰ Ryan, Kurt J., COL, *Exploring Alternatives for Strategic Access to Afghanistan*, (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 13.

more U.S. military forces and services into theater. Whether processing Soldiers for Rest and Recuperation Leave, or getting a spare engine for a C-130, almost anything was available in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. The surge of 2010-2011 refocused the country on the efforts in Afghanistan when efforts in Iraq were dwindling. During this time, the infrastructure within the country was fairly well established. Internal distribution was made easier by contract rotary and fixed wing aviation, increased military rotary wing resources, as well as dedicated logistical transportation units which facilitated and escorted Afghan trucks in convoys across the country.

The primary question is whether the Global Force Posture of 2001 enabled the U.S. operational and logistical success in Operation Enduring Freedom? It is obvious that Afghanistan was a geographic challenge for military planners. U.S. Naval Forces provided a quick response and combat power off the coast in the Indian Ocean, but initially did not have the overflight rights or tanker support to strike targets in central and northern Afghanistan. While the 9/11 attacks helped galvanize international support for U.S. military intervention, most countries that provided basing, access or overflight benefitted greatly from U.S. largess (aid, military technology, debt forgiveness, etc.). What did greatly benefit U.S. access was the security cooperation efforts of the CENTCOM leaders and supporting units in the years leading up to 9/11. The Partnership for Peace initiative, other small unit security cooperation missions, as well as CENTCOM Senior Leader Engagement with the northern Stans helped open the door for basing and operations in support of OEF. Pakistan was a separate challenge, but eventually the Pakistani fear of an aroused and dangerous United States facilitated a permissive basing environment. The U.S. provided Security Assistance funds, and the promise of more in

the future led to Pakistani acquiescence and what became a challenging and temperamental partnership in the Global War on Terrorism.¹¹

The U.S. force posture in the Middle East circa 2001 provided the ability to surge forces and provide mission command from the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. This capability was helpful but probably by itself not critical to the operation. While perhaps some smaller items and ammunition were used from Army Prepositioned Set-5 (in Kuwait), the threat of Saddam Hussein and Iraq loomed. The Heavy Brigade Combat Set in Kuwait was not needed for Afghanistan and combat vehicles were all flown in from CONUS or subsequently brought in through the Port of Karachi. Once Iraq began in March 2003, the focus shifted off of Afghanistan and operations there for many years. Air bases inside of Afghanistan were built, expanded and improved, but these infrastructure efforts should have been completed quicker to base fighter and cargo aircraft there earlier. It was really the relationships, political will and diplomacy following 9/11 that enabled access which subsequently enabled posture and offensive combat operations from Uzbekistan, support from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and many others. The security cooperation, the daily engagement on behalf of the country team, and joint-combined exercise and training by U.S. Special Operations Forces and others, coupled with the financial and military aid promises, facilitated the initial operations and eventual success in Afghanistan.

¹¹ Robert Harkavy, *Thinking about Basing, Reposturing the Force, U.S. Overseas Presence in the 21st Century*, (Newport, RI, Naval War College Press, 2006), 26.

Chapter 4-Evaluating the Pre-Positioned Equipment Programs

With a U.S. military focus on expeditionary operations and rapid deployment, utilizing a smaller footprint, it may be appropriate to intensify efforts and resources on the planning and proliferation of pre-positioned equipment. These lessons are a result of the contingency deployments of the 1990s and the decision to invest in technology and conduct warfare with smaller, more capable formations (i.e.; Operation Iraqi Freedom with 175,000 Soldiers vs. the 300-400,000 the Army Chief of Staff recommended). Having fewer resources and personnel in the near future are realities of the Budget Control Act that the military leadership must fully consider. If the U.S. military hopes to achieve many of the objectives outlined in the strategic documents evaluated in Chapter Two, then it must rely upon the global access and posture its current facilities provide. The concept of pre-positioning is a reinforcing effort to global force posture and the intent is to provide support to forces arriving from CONUS or other forward deployed U.S. military locations.

Having pre-positioned stocks of high demand and heavy items will cut down on transit times and be less of a burden on key transportation systems at the outset of a conflict. The concept of utilizing pre-positioned equipment is not new, but the Marines revitalized their program in 1979 and the Army did not reconfigure its organization until after the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Storm) in 1993. Equipment was previously based in Germany after World War II for use against the Soviet Army should it come through the Fulda Gap. This equipment was part of the Pre-position of Material Configured for Unit Sets (POMCUS) and the Combat Equipment Group-Europe (CEG-E) systems that were exercised every time a major REFORGER (Return of Forces to Europe) Exercise was

conducted. To support the National Security Strategy of 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a study of U.S. mobility assets and forces. The results of the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study led to new airlift and sealift forces while recommending that the Army pre-position sets of heavy equipment aboard ships be closely staged to potential trouble spots.¹

The Army Strategic Mobility Program (1993) recommended the capability to provide a Corps sized force of 5.5 Divisions in 75 days to any global hotspot.² The current Army Prepositioned Equipment Doctrine is based on the Secretary of Defense's "Operational Availability Action Items" directive of 18 August 2003, which outlined the requirements for the DoD's Joint Swiftness Goals (deploy to a distant theater in ten days, defeat the enemy in 30 days, and be ready for an additional fight in 30 days). The Army's goals for its Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) system included: theater reception capability in advance deployment of heavy units from CONUS; capability to overcome anti-access especially in northeast and southwest Asia; and provide a flexible deterrent capability.³ Not including many of the USMC and USAF land based programs and systems, the Military Sealift Command has over 30 strategically located ships loaded with military equipment and supplies to support the U.S. military and Defense Logistics Agency in support of the prepositioning program.⁴ As a critical part of the Strategic Mobility Triad (Prepo, Sealift, Airlift), each service manages its prepo program a little differently. This is partly because of the different ways each service fights and how they

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Michael Tucker, *U.S. Army, Army Pre-Positioned Stocks*, *Military Review*, May/June 2000, 53-54.

² Ibid.

³ Department of Defense/United States Army, *Army Prepositioned Operations*, FM 3-35.1, (Washington, DC; Department of the Army, 1 July 2008), 1-1.

⁴ Military Sealift Command Ships, *Seapower Almanac 2007*, January 2007, 54.

are organized. U.S. Special Operations Command maintains its own pre-positioned equipment and stocks although it is certainly of lesser quantity than other services (called the Special Operations Forces Support Activity-SOFSA at Bluegrass Army Depot, KY). Whether the Marine Expeditionary Brigade Set in Norway or USAF Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) around the world, the concept, utility, and usefulness of the pre-positioned equipment is not disputed.

What is perhaps disputable in the discussion of pre-positioned equipment is whether the services have the right type (and amount) of equipment in these programs, and if there is value with some variant of joint oversight or the development of joint requirements. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) published studies in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012 on various issues with the services and how they report, utilize, and reconstitute their unique prepositioned equipment. Congressional legislation directs the GAO to conduct assessments of the services prepositioning programs to determine if the service's reports to Congress are accurate and to identify the major challenges the services face in their prepositioning programs.⁵ The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 took the reporting requirements even further, requiring the services to report on their prepositioned equipment at the end of every fiscal year. These reports must include: (1) the level of fill for major end items and spare parts; (2) material condition of the items; (3) items used during the fiscal year and whether they were returned; (4) timeline for reconstituting any missing items; (5) estimate of required funding to complete reconstitution; and (6) a list of any operational plans affected by a

⁵ United States Government Accountability Office, *Defense Logistics, Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army's Prepositioning Strategy, 07-144*, by William M. Solis, Open-File Report, U.S. GAO (Washington, DC, 2007).

shortfall in prepositioned equipment stockage levels and actions taken to mitigate the potential shortfalls.⁶ Continued efforts to manage and oversee the prepositioning program came in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act that included an additional six reporting requirements: (7) a list of non-standard items for inclusion and how to fund their inclusion and sustainment; (8) a list of any items used in support of OIF, Operation New Dawn (OND), OEF slated for retrograde and subsequent inclusion in the prepositioned stocks; (9) an efficiency strategy for limited shelf life medical equipment; (10), the status of efforts to develop a joint strategy, integrate service requirements, and eliminate redundancies; (11) operational planning assumptions used in the formulation of prepositioned stock levels and composition and; (12) a list of any strategic plans affected by changes to the levels.⁷ A consistent theme in these reports is that the Joint Staff should provide more oversight over the programs and should consider means to make the entire effort more joint if possible.

The Joint Staff provides doctrinal oversight over the process of how prepo equipment is used, and this oversight is laid out in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 4310.01C, dated 1 August 2012, titled *Logistics Planning Guidance for Global Pre-Positioned Material Capabilities*. The CJCSI refers to Prepo as Pre-Positioned and War Reserve Material (PWRM afloat or ashore, either CONUS or OCONUS). PWRM is apportioned to combatant commanders for full-spectrum adaptive

⁶ United States Government Accountability Office, *Defense Logistics, Department of Defense's Annual Report on the Status of Prepositioned Material and Equipment Can be Further Enhanced to Better Inform Congress 10-172R*, by William M. Solis, Open-File Report, U.S. GAO (Washington, DC, 2009).

⁷ United States Government Accountability Office, *Prepositioned Material and Equipment: DoD Would Benefit from Developing Strategic Guidance and Improving Joint Oversight 12-916R*, by Cary B. Russell, Open-File Report, U.S. GAO, (Washington, DC, 2012)

planning and it is not allocated (released for employment) without Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approval.⁸

While the CJCSI lays out responsibilities for how to use PWRM and plan for its use, it does not state or dictate what the services must put or enter into the program. It outlines the owning service for the PWRM is responsible (and will coordinate) for restocking, reconstitution, and/or return with U.S. Transportation Command any PWRM that is used in a conflict or contingency.⁹ Services still maintain the authority for their PWRM and the services are responsible for any and all funding in relation to their equipment.

Following extensive use of PWRM in OIF in 2004-07 by the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and then again by the services in support of OEF in the 2010 surge, reconstitution of these assets is a significant financial burden. With Overseas Contingency Operations funds drying up, the funding for PWRM, especially reconstitution, becomes a challenging budgetary issue. The retrograde from Afghanistan (and earlier in Iraq) were also critical to the reset, reconstitution, and modernization of all the services' prepo equipment. The decision to induct Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles into the program, as well as a great deal of other combat systems and support equipment into prepo, was a prudent decision as the items were still serviceable and already deployed 8,000 miles from CONUS and closer to existing APS or other WRM storage sites (Kuwait, Oman, Diego Garcia, Europe, etc.). Other high demand

⁸ Department of Defense, The Joint Staff, CJCSI 4310.01C, Logistics Planning Guidance for Global Pre-Positioned Material Capabilities, (Washington, DC, The Joint Staff, August 2012), 1.

⁹ Ibid., A-9.

items used in Afghanistan, such as Basic Expeditionary Airfield (BEAR) equipment, to quickly increase capacity or establish forward operating bases and airfields is typically not reutilized. Having access to these types of equipment is essential for commanders and their logisticians to provide capacity and flexibility for austere basing on a truly global scale. Modern technological advances in mobile tents, power generation, and other structures often facilitate a fully capable and functional field hospital, a joint task force headquarters or helicopter maintenance and storage hangars in a highly expeditious manner.

As recommended in multiple GAO reports, and as Congress pointed out in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2008 and 2012, the DoD must improve the oversight of the prepositioning assets and systems to cut down on redundancies as well as making the services take a more joint approach to organization, utilization, and inclusion of systems for future conflicts. While the services will all have unique service-specific items in the prepo systems for years to come (unique spare parts, munitions, etc.), there must be a renewed effort and vigor to streamline where possible, based on the fiscal challenges ahead. The oversight of this system must be turned over to an empowered existing joint entity if the DoD expects to reap any benefits from these recommendations. The Joint Staff likely does not have the capacity or authority, but perhaps with some augmentation the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) does. This task is aligned with some of the core mission sets of DLA. If funding for portions of the prepo enterprise was held by DLA, and then distributed to the services, it could assist in complicity for all of these reporting and joint requirements.

The concept of PWRM (afloat or ashore) is a valid means to help meet the strategic military goals of the United States. With the continued closure of U.S. military overseas facilities, more PWRM would assist in decreasing response time to global crises. Whether 2,000lb bombs or Humanitarian Assistance Items, having these materials on hand and preferably in a location closer to where they are needed is a significant force multiplier. Requests for additional PWRM should be solicited from each of the Geographic Combatant Commands and from U.S. Special Operations Command. Between the Services and Combatant Commanders, the right PWRM will fill a capability gap as the United States defense budgets drive a decreased overseas force posture. With proper oversight and specific funding for reconstitution, use of the PWRM should be relatively straight forward (from a systems perspective) and should not require SECDEF approval. Military planners should consider aligning some PWRM with every Combatant Command and keeping some truly as a National War Reserve and Stocks. The recommended approval level should be the Combatant Command or DLA J-3 level approval (2 star) for the regional PWRM and the Joint Staff J-3 or CJCS/SECDEF for the National War Reserve. Frequent use of the systems will enhance overall operational readiness and with more leaders and logisticians familiar with the process, it will be more efficient to issue and subsequently turn in upon mission completion.

Chapter 5-Concluding Thoughts and Recommendations on PAX

Americana

While most military and government leaders heartily advocate for the current benefits global force posture provides, there are more than a few vocal critics of this costly proposition. Chalmers Johnson writes prolifically on the topic of “American Imperialism” and the need to bring our military empire and spending back into what he views as acceptable bounds. He suggests the concept of a PAX Americana as a parallel to the Roman Empire where the amount and type of overseas military installations spiraled out of control. He believes the United States population is generally ignorant as to the size and scope of the U.S. global infrastructure and that the populace “can’t begin to understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations or the degree to which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional order”.¹ Authors like Chalmers Johnson, Andrew Bacevich and James Fallows, passionately warn their readers about the spread of American militarism, unchecked budgets, and expanding global influence through global presence.²

While having hundreds of thousands of military personnel, dependents, government civilians, and contractors at military installations around the world is expensive, there are obviously numerous benefits. Not only is there benefit for the U.S. national interests, but often many others for the host nation (including economic for the

¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Dismantling the Empire*, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 109.

² Andrew Bacevich, *Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed their Soldiers and their Country*, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2013), 80; James Fallows, *The Tragedy of the American Military*, *The Atlantic*, January/February 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/12/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/> accessed on April 1, 2015).

infusion of funds for required services and materials). In Stacie Pettyjohn's Rand Study of U.S. Global Defense Posture from 1783-2011, she identifies two primary models for the justification or rationale of overseas military basing. The mutual defense and transactional models offer something to both the host nation as well as the occupying or tenant force.³ The mutual defense model was a principle motivational factor during the Cold War, but is less so in the increasingly globalized and connected world (less places like South Korea). Access because of treaty obligations and mutual defense organizations like NATO would still fall in the mutual defense category or model. The transactional model describes what potential compensation, trade, aid, or other "sweeteners" are offered for access. As always, the U.S. must appreciate the fact that the host nation can revoke U.S. basing rights as a result of changing political forces, public opinion in the host country, etc.⁴

It is a challenging and significant endeavor to derive a cost-benefit analysis for overseas basing. While beyond the scope of this thesis, but a Rand study in 2013 tried to do exactly that. The study essentially found that conducting security cooperation or deploying to or in support of contingency operations from CONUS is more expensive than from forward basing locations in Europe or the Middle East.⁵ As an example, they studied the costs of a U.S. Army unit conducting security cooperation in Africa either from Europe or from CONUS. They also attempted to do the same thing with the deployment of USAF flight detachments from Europe to Africa for short duration

³ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2012), 105.

⁴ *Ibid*, 105.

⁵ Lostumbo, Michael J., and Michael J. McNerney, *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces, An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits* (Santa Monica, CA; Rand Corporation, 2013), 306-310.

deployments. The results are challenging to validate, but claim that it would be at least 25% more expensive to execute the training from CONUS than from their current facilities in Europe.⁶ The other challenge is measuring deterrence or other immeasurable factors (such as relationships) that a forward military presence provides. The concept of cooperative security and the potential enhanced status of the nation because of its association and partnership with the U.S. military is viewed as positive in some places in the world. The Rand Cost vs. Benefit Study also states the danger of pulling back from forward presence. Decreasing the amount of forward presence could contribute to the adversaries' perceptions (even if not the reality) that the United States has less capacity to prevent aggression, which could lead an adversary to calculate that a quick initial victory at relatively low cost might be possible.⁷ The idea that U.S. presence will deter most nation states (although perhaps not terrorist actions as witnessed in the last 20 years) from offensive or aggressive action is still a likely deterrent in many places around the world.

As the United States ponders the way ahead and plots a strategic course for the future, the following list provides some ideas and recommendations for effectively and efficiently managing its Global Force Posture and readiness to respond to conflict around the globe in support of its national interests:

1. Commit to a formal and comprehensive DoD Global Force Posture Review to Congress every ten years. By incorporating this type of formal review into the standard planning horizons it establishes the need for accountability and prevents Combatant Commands or the Services from getting in front of any policy

⁶ Ibid, 219-223.

⁷ Ibid, 262-263.

decisions from the DoD or national leadership. Working in conjunction with the Country Teams and taking a whole of government approach with azimuth checks at the five-year mark would ensure that the United States ends up with the facilities and installations that remain in the best interest of the nation and the treasury. Unlike the BRAC process within the boundaries of the United States, these OCONUS closures do not require Congressional approval and are therefore executed with greater expediency.

2. Align the CONUS Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) with this proposed Global Force Posture Review. Especially with the recent downsizing of the Army and USAF, the Services have excess capacity within CONUS, and all facilities should be relooked every five years, regardless of partisan politics. Recent reporting from the DoD is that there is 25-35% excess capacity than what is at CONUS military facilities.⁸ As the Chief of Staff of the Army said in March 2014 Congressional testimony, “to maintain an empty building is to throw money away”.⁹ This recommendation does not imply that the U.S. military leadership should cut the current and proposed military construction where needed to improve or modernize infrastructure, but the BRAC must align resources with where they are needed the most. The previous Congress (December 2014) would not even entertain the prospect of a BRAC. The BRAC results are always divisive and historically affect hundreds or thousands of government and

⁸ DoD News, “Pentagon Official Says DOD Needs More BRAC”, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121221> (accessed February 23, 2015).

⁹ Defense News, “U.S. Army Leaders Push for Another BRAC Round”, <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140325/DEFREG02/303250029/US-Army-Leaders-Push-Another-BRAC-Round> (accessed January 7, 2015).

supporting employees in Congressional districts, but the long-term benefits far outweigh the relatively short term losses. In Stacie Pettyjohn's Rand Study, she advocates for aligning both a CONUS and OCONUS BRAC together in a way similar to the 2004 Global Posture Review and the 2005 BRAC.¹⁰ While perhaps not planned this way, these reviews provided a good model for the future and a comprehensive review of all military facilities and installations is prudent in the fiscally restrained environment.

3. Move oversight of the Prepositioned and War Reserve Material (PWRM) to a single Joint entity, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, and empower it to conduct employment/deployment and reconstitution of all the equipment under their care. Conduct a comprehensive review of PWRM to identify key capabilities and requirements for the near-medium-and long-term future (5-20 years). This review should include a historical analysis of how PWRM was used in the last 14 years of conflict and should include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief modules. With the inevitable decrease in global force posture and budget, an expansion of PWRM equipment is prudent. Investment in maritime prepositioning and appropriate sealift ships with capability to offload at unimproved ports is an essential element of the strategic deployability triad and investment in this capability must be sustained. Making PWRM completely joint would lead to enhanced efficiencies and would likely cut down on global transportation costs in regards to common user equipment or logistics. Allowing greater access to PWRM by making the approval authority for release at a lower

¹⁰ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, *U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2012), 106-107.

level will increase familiarity with the systems and would speed the issue and reconstitution of items in the future.

4. When force posture decreases, the U.S. must continue to increase security cooperation efforts. Whether a 12 man Special Forces Team, a Coast Guard Cutter working counter-drug missions/training, or a Marine Expeditionary Unit conducting a planned rotational training exercise, security cooperation efforts are typically high payoff for a relatively low cost. When the U.S. military engages with other military or law enforcement forces, the other nations often see the U.S. forces as professional and good ambassadors for the nation. Security Cooperation exercises help build relationships and familiarity between nations. It provides the U.S. forces an opportunity to operate in a different environment and learn about host nation culture and customs. These programs are reinforced by other whole of government approaches including foreign military sales/funding efforts, International Military Education and Training program, and other foreign aid and law enforcement programs. Security cooperation efforts hope to improve the U.S. national security by ensuring our partner forces are more interoperable, prepared, better postured. Accomplishing this in Phase Zero, or during the shaping phase of the campaign, prevents escalation into subsequent phases and helps to prevent future conflict.¹¹ As witnessed during initial operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. did not have the global force posture to immediately conduct operations on the ground, but relationships built over time helped to build and gain access. GEN

¹¹ LTC Michael Hartmayer and LTC John Hansen, Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy, Military Review, January-February 2013, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130228_art007.pdf (accessed on February 24, 2015).

Tommy Franks' (former CENTCOM Commander) testimony to Congress, in 2003 before his retirement, strongly advocated for continued efforts and funding of this critical capability. He said that it helps to build friendly nations' military capabilities and provides U.S. forces with access and en route infrastructure.¹²

5. Conduct all future Force Posture Reviews with the idea of global infrastructure having a power or force projection capability (as a requirement). The United States still maintains many facilities because of its defense in depth strategy developed and implemented during the Cold War. While those U.S. forces in Korea may have to "fight tonight", the vast majority of forward deployed U.S. forces will not fight from their overseas installations. Just as CONUS installations improved their infrastructure to deploy (as a result of the Global War on Terror), every overseas installation must do the same. While one cannot apply this litmus to every overseas installation such as some high level, joint headquarters and academic training facilities, any location that houses operationally capable or deployable forces must have redundant means of getting their forces to the fight. Whether rail, sea, air, or ground transportation, if the U.S. cannot project its capability from that location, its value is marginalized and it does not provide significant capability or advantage (assuming it is closer to the deployment location than CONUS based forces). Infrastructure development and improvements that support force projection are wise decisions for the future.

¹² Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, USMC (RET) and Noah Lukeman, "Appendix A, Statement by General Tommy Franks" in *Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing INC, 2004), 153-154.

As stated in Chapter Two, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in his conclusion to the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, “we will be the only nation able to globally project military massive power....but we also have considerable responsibilities...protect allies, be globally present to deter conflict, protect the global commons and keep war from our shores. These obligations are unique to the U.S. military, and they are inherently expensive”.¹³ While the United States will likely continue to draw down its military spending and global force posture in the next five years, it still maintains an incredible capability with unprecedented global reach. Security cooperation efforts and attempts to regionally align forces will help mitigate future shortfalls in force posture. To do all of these things well, every deployment, commitment, and overseas installation must be measured in support of vital national interests. The continued fast pace of overseas operations using and maintaining the existing global infrastructure while shrinking budgets are not sustainable.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review*, March, 2014 (Washington, DC., Department of Defense), 63.

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Vita

LTC(P) Scott Noon (USA) is a 1994 graduate of James Madison University. He is a Logistics Corps officer with experience in Airborne, Air Assault, Mechanized, and Special Operations Forces at a variety of levels. He served in the 101st Airborne Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the Joint Special Operations Command. He has one deployment to Iraq (OIF I), and five deployments to Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. His most recent assignment was Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from 2011-2014. During this command, the HHBn, 101st deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan where they were responsible for Regional Command – East and the LTC Noon was responsible for the 1200+ personnel in the Headquarters and attached units. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has Masters Degrees in Military Arts and Sciences as well as Leadership and Management. LTC Noon is married with three boys.